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ANNEX III

REMEDIAL ACTIONS TO IMPROVE THE PERFORMANCE AND  
NEGOTIATING POSITION OF THE GKR

1. Make all possible efforts to allow some form of U.S. air support to continue in Cambodia. We recognize that in light of the current Congressional climate and recent Congressional actions (e.g., passage of the "Eagleton Amendment"), the Executive Branch's room for maneuver in this area may be virtually non-existent. Nonetheless, the importance of continuing some form of air support to the Cambodians until a cease-fire can be negotiated can scarcely be over-emphasized. Air support is necessary both for its immediate physical impact on military operations and -- even more -- for the psychological impact the continuation, or cessation, of such support would have on the GKR and on the Communist side (including the Khmer insurgents, Sihanouk and Hanoi).

a. The most essential form of air support is lift and resupply. Without this, FANK would disintegrate in short order.

b. Next in priority order comes tactical air support of combat operations. Its loss would be serious but not necessarily fatal.

c. Third in priority ranking are B-52 strikes which are, of course, helpful but could be used as a trade-off or bargaining counter with Congress to preserve b and/or -- above all -- a.

2. Induce Lon Nol to leave Cambodia as soon as possible. Both the strengthening of the Phnom Penh Government internally and the establishment of a basis for meaningful negotiations rest

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upon the departure of Lon Nol. His absence is a necessary -- though not a sufficient -- condition for the achievement of our other objectives. An orchestrated effort, supported behind the scenes by the U.S., should be made through the members of the GKR High Council and other avenues of influence to remove Lon Nol from the scene. Lon Nol is increasingly divorced from reality, and the best approach would be for all Cambodian officials with access to him discreetly to encourage him to seek medical attention now and not continue to delay on this issue. Lon Nol has requested that Dr. Irving Cooper of New York examine him. We should make every effort to have Dr. Cooper accommodate this request. In so doing, Dr. Cooper should insist that proper diagnosis requires that the examination take place in New York. We should then seek to have the doctor recommend treatment or therapy which would keep Lon Nol out of Cambodia for at least the next 90 days or so.

3. Keep Lon Nol's brother Lon Non out of Cambodia indefinitely. If this has not already been done, the Departments of State and Defense, who are responsible for handling Lon Non's present trip to the U.S., should work out an extended program which ensures Lon Non's continued absence from Cambodia. The U.S. should privately but strongly continue to impress upon the GKR that Lon Nol is not to be allowed to return to Cambodia under any circumstances.

4. Make an all-out effort to improve Cambodian Army (FANK) performance over the short term. Once Lon Nol is out of the picture, it should be possible to persuade the remaining members of the GKR High Council that their first priority efforts must be devoted to improving the effectiveness of the FANK. The U.S. should make it clear that the continuation of U.S. aid is dependent upon such efforts being made. Specifically, we should put heavy pressure on the Cambodians to do the following:

- a. Give FANK Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Staff Sosthene Fernandez supreme military authority. (This should be a real, and not just a paper authority.)

b. Allow Fernandez to establish a clear and rigid chain of command within the army, and to discipline any officer who tries to bypass this chain of command.

c. Allow FANK (i.e., Fernandez) to establish its own table of organization. (The MEDT program of forming divisional-sized units has not worked well, and the Cambodian officer corps clearly does not like it.)

d. Carry out an extensive shake-up of military staff and command officers at least down to the regional level, with the specific object of eliminating the more corrupt officers. (This would help alleviate the pay problem -- see next item.)

e. Do whatever is necessary to ensure that troops -- particularly troops on the line -- are paid on time. This does not require more money. It simply requires a reasonably honest distribution of funds which are already provided to the FANK. (We should investigate the possibility of U.S. personnel actually carrying the funds to the major combat units and personally distributing them to the troops. This approach has been effective in Laos.) The lack of pay is one of the principal reasons for poor FANK morale and poor FANK performance. Past experience indicates that if the troops are paid, they will fight. Thus, this step is the one most likely to show the greatest results in the shortest time.

f. Make an all-out attempt to show demonstrable progress toward meeting the needs of military dependents (better housing, allowances, other benefits). This is vital to improved morale -- the Khmer Krom units have been particularly affected by lack of support in this area.

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g. Encourage the Khmer Krom leader Son Ngoc Thanh to use his talents more frequently as a mobile morale officer visiting troops in the field (his health permitting). Son Ngoc Thanh is "gung ho," articulate, and has good rapport with the troops, many of whom he recruited. The FANK should be canvassed for other officers of similar effectiveness who can show the troops in the field that the government in Phnom Penh cares about them. Members of the General Staff should pay frequent visits to the battle zones, to hand out individual and unit citations and promotions.

h. Encourage Fernandez to eliminate superfluous personnel from the General Staff and the Ministry of National Defense. Encourage the General Staff and the Ministry of National Defense to work longer hours.

i. Encourage FANK units to take better advantage of tactical air support when it is provided to them, and also to take advantage of present weaknesses which are evident in various Khmer Insurgent units.

j. Encourage Fernandez to apply the philosophy within the FANK that there are no bad units, only bad commanders. He should require that commanders stay with their troops and take responsibility for what each unit does or does not do. He should punish commanders who are absent from their posts. He should prohibit military personnel from taking second jobs outside the FANK. He should require that soldiers and officers always be in uniform while on duty. In these and other seemingly small ways, Fernandez, if given real authority, should be able to improve the esprit of the FANK rapidly and at low cost.

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5. In the economic sphere, the rice supply situation remains pivotal and must be carefully monitored, although the most recent information indicates that the anticipated exhaustion of Phnom Penh's rice stocks about the beginning of July has been averted by promises of immediate deliveries from Thailand and South Vietnam. The maintenance of open lines of communication to permit delivery of rice up the Mekong from South Vietnam and via Route 5 from Battambang remains a vital mission for FANK. (As of 28 June, Route 5 has once again been closed as a result of enemy action.) We will also need to monitor performance on the promised deliveries from Thailand and South Vietnam, and to press the GKR for improvement in maintenance of controls on distribution.

6. Major efforts should be made to improve and make more dependable the generation of electric power in Phnom Penh. The highly sporadic availability of electricity in Phnom Penh has a demoralizing effect on the populace which, coupled with the fear of rice shortages, contributes to an atmosphere in the city in which the potential for large-scale civil unrest is not very far below the surface. Although Phnom Penh could probably use more generating capacity, existing capacity is unused because petroleum is not available to fuel the generators on a full-time basis. Efforts should be expanded to move petroleum supplies up the Mekong in order to keep Phnom Penh's present generating plants in operation. (Since the Mekong has now overflowed its banks, Khmer Insurgent forces have lost much of their protective cover near the river. For the remainder of the rainy season it should therefore be easier to move convoys up the Mekong than it has been in the past several months.)

7. The Net Impact. In spite of the present parlous situation in Cambodia, it is conceivable that the sum of the above suggested measures might be greater than the individual parts if the GKR is able to regain some of its confidence and sense of national purpose by addressing and righting a portion of its many problems. The psychological impact of regaining some political, military and economic momentum could be a major factor in providing the GKR with badly needed

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bargaining assets to take to the negotiating table. The continuation of at least some level of U.S. air support during this period would also provide the GKR and the U.S. with a useful bargaining chip to set negotiations in train and to serve as an asset in dealing with the Communists.